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It is still considered self-evident that aesthetics has to be artistics:
'And we cannot get outside it. for it lies in our discipline and this
discipline seems to repeat it to us inexorably' (to adapt Wittgenstein) '.
But there are very good reasons for trying to escape from the aesthetics-
artistics equation. for one of the central problems of traditional
aesthetics is that it is incapable of doing justice to the singularity of
works of art. The late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century
conversion of aesthetics into a philosophical attempt to establish a
universal and everlasting concept of art. one that is indifferent to
individual works and to historically different types of art. cannot
hold. Art does not consist in exemplifying a universal concept. rather
it involves the creation of new concepts along with new practices.
The new concept will certainly have some aspects in common with
the conc~pt formerly dominant. but will differ from it sharply in
other. no less important aspects. This is obvious in every shift
from one style or paradigm to another. Hence. paradigms are connected
by the overlapping of one concept with the next-by 'family
resemblances' in the Wittgensteinian sense-not by a universal panern
or an essential, indwelling form. There is no such thing as an essence
of art.
This means the traditional approach is bascd on a fundamental
misundcrstanding of the concept of art. Insight into the historical
genesis of different concepts of art through art itself makes this
failure obvious and commands the shift to a different. pluralistic type
of aesthetics. But the reorganisation of aesthctics which we currently
have to consider must go even further beyond the traditional
equation of aesthetics and artistics. The inncr pluralisation of artistics
-the shift from a monoconceptual analysis of art to the consideration
of different types. paradigms. and concepts of art-should be
supplcmented by an outcr pluralisation of aesthetics: an expansion of
the disciplinc's field to include transartistic questions and the
development of a transdisciplinary structure. That is what I want to
advocate in this essay.
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I
There are, generally speaking, two groups of reasons for a broadening
of aesthetics: the first refers to the contemporary fa<;hioning of reality.
the second to the contemporary understanding of reality. Today, we
are experiencing an unprecedented aestheticisation of the real world;
embellishment and styling are to be found everywhere.2 Individuals
are undergoing a comprehensive styling of body, soul. and behaviour.
for example. In beauty salons and fitness centres they pursue the
aesthetic perfection of their bodies; in meditation courses and New
Age seminars they practice the aestheticisation of their souls;
etiquette courses train them for aesthetically desirable behavior. The
homo aestheticus has become the new role model.
In urban areas, moreover. just about everything has been subjected
to a facelift over the last years, at least in the rich western countries.
The economy. too, profits largely from the consumers' tendency,
not so much to acquire an article. but by means of that article to buy
themselves into the aesthetic lifestyle with which advertising strategies
have linked it. Even ecology is, in aesthetic regards, a partner of the
economy. It is on the way to being an embellishment sector and
favours a styling of the environment in the spirit of aesthetic ideals
like complexity or natural beauty. If the rich industrial societies
were able to do completely as they wish, they would transform the
urhan, industrial and natural environment ill toto into a hyperaesthetic
scenario. Genetic engineering. which links individual and ecological
styling, is a further piece of evidence. It adapts all sorts of life to our
needs and enables us, according to our aesthetic expectations. to
provide just the sort of children we desire. Genetic engineering is a
kind of genetic cosmetic surgery.
It is surely not necessary to expand on these tendencies towards
embellishment and globalised aestheticisation in detail. The
phenomena are all too obvious. Equally obvious, however, is the fact
that reflection on these phenomena becomes obligatory. since they
represent not only an extension of the aesthetic, but at the same time
alter the configuration and valency of the aesthetic. Hence aesthetics,
as the reflective authority of the aesthetic, must also seek out the state
of the aesthetic today in fields such as the lifeworld and politics,
economy and ecology, ethics and science. It must. in short, take
account of the new configuration of the aesthetic. This does not mean
that the globalisation and fundamentalisation of the aesthetic is simply
to be sanctioned. but it does belong on today's agenda for every
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sufficient aesthetic diagnosis and critique.
The issues of an aesthetics beyond aesthetics concern not only
those who are already willing to broaden the reach of aesthetics.
therefore. but likewise represent an obligatory subject for those who
still adhere to the traditional framework of aesthetics. Old aesthetic
dreams arc being redeemed in the present aestheticisation. But the
irritating fact which demands explanation is that the results today
are quite different from the original expectations. They arc. at the
very least. disappointing. What was meant to endow our world with
beauty ends up in mere prettiness and pushiness, and finally generates
indifference or even disgust, at least among aesthetically sensitive
people. The globalised aesthetic may even be experienced as terror.
In any case, nobody would dare to call the present aestheticisation
straightforward fulfilment. Something must then be wrong with this
redemption of old aesthetic dreams. Either the current application
of old programmes is inadequate, or these venerable programmes
themsclws already contained a flaw. one which has just remained
hidden so far, and which is now being revealed.
Thus redemptions equate to revelations. The fact that ubiquitous
beauty loses its distinguished character and decays into mere
prettiness or becomes simply meaningless confirms that what is
exceptional cannot be made standard without changing its quality.
The strategy of globalised aestheticisation falls victim to itself.
moreover. and ends in anaestheticisation or a willed aesthetic
indifference designed to avoid the importunity of this ubiquitous
'beauty'. A need for the non-aesthetic arises. a desire for interruptions
and disruptions, for breaking through embellishment. If there is still a
task for art in public space today. then it consists not in introducing
ever more beauty into the already over-embellished environment, but
in stopping this aestheticisation machinery by creating aesthetic fallow
areas, deserts in the midst of the hyperaesthetic.
These critical experiences with the contemporary redemption of
the old aesthetic dreams of the world's enhancement must have
repercussions for our assessment of a traditional aesthetics which
never even conceived that universal embellishment might disfigure
the world, instead of consummating or even redeeming it. Yet the same
traditional aesthetics is repeatedly invoked as rhetorical support for the
current aestheticisation processes. A threefold criticism of traditional
aesthetics is thus called for. First, objection must be raised to the
unqualified praise of beauty. To do this, one can either distinguish
between, on the one hand. mere prettiness as a good common to both
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'the enlightened and the unenlightened' and, on the other, an exceptional
and moving phenomenon of the kind Rilke described when he said
that beauty was 'the beginning of what's frightening'.3 Alternatively,
one can consider that beauty represents a value only in opposition to
standard non-beauty, one however which loses its distinctiveness by
its very propagation. Second, traditional aesthetics forgot the discovery
-which was a discovery of aesthetics itself, incidentally-that not a
single aesthetic quality alone, but variatio delectat. This flaw becomes
painfully dear in the present embellishment. Aesthetics, which may be
the pluralist discipline par excellence, falsely singularised itself and
failed to recognise that homogenisation is systematically wrong in
aesthetic respects too. Third, the efficacy of traditional aesthetics in the
household of our cultural beliefs and desires needs to be critically
questioned. Aesthetics has every reason to become self-critical.
The second group of arguments that I mentioned in favor of the turn to
an aesthetics beyond aesthetics refers to the current apprehension of
reality, which has become, as I want to demonstrate, more and more
aesthetic. An obvious predominance of images and aesthetic patterns
exists today. not only in the current shaping ofreality, but in the current
mediation of reality as well. This dominance stretches from the
presentation of single objects or subjects and the nature of our daily
news, through to our basic understanding of reality. Think, say, of the
pictorial dominance in advertising and in the self-presentation of
companies, or of our own visual appearance in the World Wide Web.
Or think ofthe pictorial demands of television which not only selectively
determine what might count as news at all, but have recently also tinted
the presentation of news outside television in, say, the printed media.
Finally, think ofchange in our apprehension ofreality. In earliertimes,
to count as being real, something had to be calculable; today it has to be
aesthetically presentable. Aesthetics has become the new leading
currency in the reality trade.
These phenomena are far too familiar and have often been analysed.
In considering their effects on aesthetics I will concentrate on just one
point---{)n what I call the 'derealisation of reality' -and on two of its
consequences: the reconfiguration of aisthesis and the revalidation of
experiences outside electronic media. By 'derealisation of reality' I
mean the fact that reality as it is conveyed by the media is deeply
affected by this type of mediation,4 due to the pecularities of media
aesthetics which generally favors the free mohility and weightlessness
of bodies and images. Everything is an object for possible electronic
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manipulation; within the media. 'manipulation' is no longer a normative.
it is practically a descriptive term. Whatever enters the realm of
television, steps into a realm of transformability instead of constancy.
If there is a 'lightness of being' anywhere. then it is in the electronic
realm. Think. say. of the Gulf War reports which sometimes deluded
us with technological simulations. whereas the reality of victims was
never shown. Or take the example of pixel technology. Ultimately you
never know whether you are witnessing a playback of reality or a
simulation. the difference between them becoming less and less evident
and tending to lose significance as the viewer's desire for media
entertainment gains the upper hand in the same measure as the former
hclicfin the reality of what is transmitted is disappearing. Accordingly,
the media themselves-primarily television. though the effects of the
more advanced technologies only intensify the tendency-increasingly
present their pictures in modes of virtuality and playfulness.
This attitude towards media reality is extending more and more to
everyday reality too. This comes about hecause everyday reality is
being increasingly ()fmed. presented. and perceived according to
media patterns. In that television is the main bcstower and the role
model for reality. derealisation leaves its mark everywhere. The real is
tending to lose its insistency, compulsiveness, and gravity; it seems to
he becoming ever lighter. less oppressive and less obligating. Already
the importunity of media's presentation of reality no longer creates
affliction. rather its opposite: indifference.
Amidst this suspension of reality we judge and act differently,
too. Our hehavioural patterns are becoming increasingly simulatory
and interchangeable. Furthermore. a reconfiguration of aisthesis can
be observed. One ofthe consequences of media dominance. for instance,
is the challenging of the primacy of vision which has shaped occidental
culture since the Greeks and which culminates in the television age.
Vision was traditionally favoured because of its hallmarks of distance.
precision and universality. because of its capacity for determination
and its proximity to cognition. From Heraclitus through Leonardo da
Vinci to Mcrlcau-Ponty. vision was considered our most excellent and
nohle sense.
In the meantime, while the dominative patterns of perception and
cognition underlying this privilege have heen subjected to critique by
authors like Heidegger. Wittgenstein. Foucault, Derrida, and Irigaray,5
we arc currently experiencing the fact that vision is no longer the
reliable sense for contact with reality that it was once held to he. The
privilege of vision no longer hold~ in a world in which physics has
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become indemonstrable and in a world dominated by media.
Other senses have found new attention, moreover. Hearing, for
example, is being appreciated anew because of its anti-metaphysical
proximity to the event instead of to permanent being, because of its
essentially social character in contrast to the individualistic execution
of vision, and because of its link with emotional elements in opposition
to the emotionless mac;tery of phenomena through vision. Touch has
found its advocates in the same way, due both to new developments in
media technology as analyzed by Marshall McLuhan and Derrick de
Kerckhove and to its emphatically corporeal character-this again in
contrast to the 'pure', uninvolved character of vision.
In the wake of such developments an increasing departure from the
traditional hierarchy of the senses comes about. The cards of sensibility
are being reshuffled and instead of a firmly established hierarchy one
tends either to an equitable assessment of all senses, or (which I would
prefer) to different, purpose-specific hierarchies. Aesthetics should
make these new states ofaisthesis and the accompanyi ng transformation
of cultural patterns the object of its analyses, helping us carry out these
transformation processes in a clearer and more reliable way.
Besides encouraging a revaluation of the senses, media experience
and derealisation tend to encourage anew appreciation ofnon-electronic
reality and modes of experience, one in which particular emphasis is
put on those traits which are neither imitable nor replaceahle by media
experience. In other words, the highly developed electronic world does
not simply overcome or absorb traditional forms of experience, as
some media enthusiasts would have us believe. Instead, a revalidation
of ordinary experience complementing media-experience can be
observed-a point that has received too little attention in the discussions
of recent years-as we learn to value anew the resistibility and
unchangeability of the natural world as distinct from the universal
mobility and changeability of media worlds, for example. and to value
in the same way the persistence of the concrete as distinct from the free
play of information and the massivity of matter as distinct from the
levitation of imagery. In contrast to arbitrary repeatihility. uniqueness
gains value afresh. as the electronic omnipresence awakens the yearning
for another presence: for the unrepeatable presence of hic el nunc, for
the singular event. As opposed to the mutual social electronic imaginary,
we are again beginning to value more highly our own imagination, one
unavailable to others. And in the same way, we are discovering anew
the body's sovereignty and intransigence (think, say, of Nadolny's
'Discovery of Slowness'. or of Handke's praise of weariness).6
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These counter-clements do not deny the fascination of electronic
worlds, nor simply return us to sensuous experience, such as it might
have been in pre-electronic times. As revalidations are tinted by the
experience of electronic media, so are there obvious links between
electronic and non-electronic experience. In accordance with the
prevalent media tendency on the one hand, and the revalidation of non-
electronic ex(X~ricnce on the other hand. our aisthesis is becoming
twofold, pursuing both media fascination and non-media goals. We
have here an interesting example of the widespread turn to plurality
which is coming about in the present day. As we wander to and fro
between different types of reality and experience, contemporary
aisthesis is perhaps the domain where this is already happening most
naturally and successfully.
The derealisation ofreality, the reconfiguration ofaisthesis. and the
revalidation ofaccustomed forms ofexperience are therefore important
issues for a contemporary aesthetics that wants to do justice to its
name. Aesthetics would criminally hurt itself if it left the discussion
of these issues solely to the sociologist and psychologist or to the
feuilletonist.
II
In the second part of my notes towards a new form of the discipline,
I want to discuss threc remaining questions relating to my suggestion
to reorganise the territory of aesthetics by expanding it to include
issues beyond traditional aesthetics. First, why is it conceptually
correct to demand of the discipline that it should comprehend all
dimensions and meanings of the aesthetic? Second, to what extent does
the cxpansion of aesthetics bring with it advantages for the discipline.
even with regard to its narrower goal of art analysis? Third, what
would the disciplinary structure ofsuch an aesthetics beyond aesthetics
look like?
Some colleagues object to the possibility of an aesthetics beyond
aesthetics that the difference in the meanings of the term 'aesthetic'
inside and outside aesthetics would makc a discipline trying to cover
all of them hopelessly ambiguous and a victim of mcre equivocation.
Ccrtainly the expression 'aesthetic' exhibits a considerable variety of
different meanings. The term can refer to art and beauty in particular;
to aisthesis in general; to a type of unobligating existence; to an
ontology of virtuality. fictionality, and suspension. 'Anything-and
nothing-is right', as Wittgenstcin once noted, 'this is the position you
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are in if you look for definitions ... in aesthetics'.7
But does this polyvalence really condemn it to unusability?
Wittgenstein himself pointed to a way out of this alleged conceptual
difficulty by demonstrating that an expression's coherence need not
be due to a unitary essence, but can come from what he called 'family
resemblances'. In the discipline of aesthetics such a coherence is
quite possible based on the family resemblances between the
different meanings of the expression 'aesthetic'. Of course, one has to
differentiate sufficiently between the different usages, but if you do
this you can, by pursuing the overlapping that connects them, reap
great benefit from this mani foldness and become capable ofdeveloping
an aesthetics which manages to cover the full range of the expression
'aesthetic' .
Aesthetics should make use of the opportunity, in other words.
and strive to comprehend the full range of such endeavors. The
polyvalence of the expression 'aesthetic' is rather an indication of
fruitfulness than of the term's unusability. It is precisely those concepts
which are important that are likely to be polyvalent, and to those the
prescription to remain unambiguous has never applied. How else, for
example, could there have been an ontology when the expression TO OV
is all but hopelessly ambiguous, just as Aristotle himself showed
before nonetheless being the first to develop an explicit concept of
ontology?R Or should one have abstained from developing a logic on
account of the different meanings of logos ('language', 'relationship',
'reason')?9 The polyvalence of an expression can be no reason for
hindering the development of a discipline that pertains to all its
variants.
Indeed, given that. (as Wittgenstein pointed out) 'the meaning of
a word is its use in the language' ,10 it would be wrong and antiquated
to dictate a single, ultimate concept of the aesthetic. Dictatorially to
exclude those purlS which do not suit one's own preferences, or to
declare one certain meaning the basic meaning amongst the diverse
meanings of the aesthetic is an imperial gesture which seeks clarity
by de facto drawing the field of the aesthetic incorrectly. Performing
conceptual bulldozing instead of a complex analysis of the problems
means failing one's duty, in both philosophy and aesthetics.
To what extent will expanding aesthetics beyond its traditional
borders bring advantages for the discipline itself? By becoming more
complex aesthetics may, admittedly, become more difficult too. But in
no longer being restricted to a narrow set of questions, it can achieve
more intense contact and interchange with other disciplines, and gain
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new fields of research. This would hring an advantage not only with
regard to the breadth of its issues, but on the institutional level as well.
The type of aesthetics I advocate will meet with greater interest, both
for the breadth of its spectrum and its contributions to contemporary
problems, and it is likely to meet with greater support-a" well as more
financial support for its research activities.
Ultimately, an expansion of aesthetics to include issues beyond art
will also prove advantageous to art analysis itself. Art always reaches
out beyond art, referring simultaneously to transartistic phenomena
and states of the aesthetic. Therefore transcending the aesthetics-
artistics equation in favor ofan aesthetics heyond aesthetics is obligatory
even with a view to the traditional nucleus of aesthetics: the analysis
of art. Even when apparently autonomous. art has always and quite
consciously reacted to states of the aesthetic in the world surrounding
it. Formerly, in a world more aesthetically sparing. it demonstrated
the Elysium of beauty; when in the modern world sensibility has been
under threat. art ha" heeded an old bond and understood itself as the
harhinger and rescuer of the sensuous (as with Matisse and Dubuffet);
where embellishment is rife, a" it is nowadays, art can see its
responsibility in countering this and behaving decidedly demurely (as
in arte povero and 'concept art').
Whatever the relationship between art and non-art might be in
detail, artworks require attention to their reference to other modes of
design and perception and an understanding of their specific intervention
in the artistic as well as transartistic states of the aesthetic. Moreover,
the energy of works always transcends their frame-the museum's
threshold, that is, or the moment of their observation. The elementary
aesthetic experience is not of art as something closed. rather it is of art
as something able to open one's eyes to other ways of viewing the
world. Among the key experiences with art-and. conversely, the tests
as to whether someone actually confers an efficacy upon art or would
like to hanish it in eulogising about its autonomy-belongs the
phenomenon, upon leaving an exhibition, of heing able suddenly (0
perceive the world with the eyes of the artist, through the optics of his
works and in the light of the aesthetics they exemplify. Thus to engage
art's perceptive form in the perception of reality and, instead of
shutting oneself off to the eflicacy of artistic optics, to operate and
experiment with them-this is natural and undistorted behaviour.
As tools for an extended or intensified perception of reality, then.
works of art bring about wondrous mental as well as emotional effects
in their human vicinity. Consider, for example, how forms ofpcrception
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which today appear natural and self-evident originated historically
in processes in which art played a pioneering role. Romantic art had a
key role in the perception of the world of mountains, for example;
much of our everyday perception derives from generations of art
experience. Something similar applies to behavioural patterns. George
Steiner has pointed out how much our amorous behaviour and rhetoric
have been formed by generations of artistic models:
The words, phrases, tropes, gestures of spirit and body with which we
seek to communicale the birth, ripening, withering of love in our
heing, with which we seck to convey these elemental experiences both
to our own perception and to 'the other', whose otherness is, at this
very point, most critical to us, are taken very largely, whether
consciously or nOl, from the repertoire of the great sayers, painters,
music-makers before us.... According to the levels of our verbal and
literate holdings, we experience and signify love as did Jack and Jill, as
did Romeo and Juliet or Tolstoy's Natasha before us. OUf jealousies
ape Othello·s.... The broken syllables which generations whispered or
panted in the rhetoric of seduction and of illlercourse were out of
Petrarch's phrase hook. I I
Beyond this production of forms of perception and behavioural
repertoires, works of art can also provide models for ways of living.
TIlis belonged to the normative demands of classical art already. of
course. but in the face of modernity's dissolution ofgeneral norms it is
still carried on in the individual's adoption of models and sentiments
for his or her own aspirations. Rilkc's contemplation of the archaic
torso of ApollO. which concludes with the line 'You must change your
life', provides an impressive example of this. 12
Thc border between art and the reality outside art certainly should
not simply be broken down, but nor should the entanglements and
transitions between the two be ignored. An aesthetics of art always
has to consider the dual character of artistics on the one hand and of
an aesthetics beyond aesthetics on the other. That is why Adorno. who
as almost no other knew of and defended the significance of art's
autonomy. nonetheless opposed the separation of art from reality and
its reduction to mere autonomy: 'How deeply [the] innervations of art
arc rooted in its position in reality could be fclt in the bomb-shattered
German cities during the first years after the war. Faced by the material
chaos. the optical order. which the aesthetic scnsorium had long since
repudiated. abruptly allured once again as blessed. '13 Even when, for
aesthetic experience, order had long since revealed itself to be a
synonym for purposive rationality, an order destroyed (destruction
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itself being due to a comparably purposive rationality) could still rouse
the aesthetic yearning for order. Adorno makes it clear that the seemingly
purely aesthetic perception is patently determined by contrast and that
aesthetic experience would be systematically misrecognised if it were
stripped of its references to reaIity.t4
Such transartistic references are not introduced to art from the
outside in some way. but inhere within the singular artwork. Let us take
as an example Goya's The Shootings of 3rd MaJ' 1808. painted in
1815. 15 lhis picture cannot simply be received in an aesthetically
contemplative manner. It offers not just an exciting colour dynamics
and compositional innovations, but simultaneously carries out the
interpretation of a historic event, and its aesthetic impulse aims for
a certain understanding of what is portrayed and serves to awaken a
new form of attitude to phenomena of the type shown. Obviously
several perceptive modes intersect in the perception of the work: the
observational manner of the picture and its artistico-aesthetic
arrangement; the expressive manner of its dynamics; the historical
manner of the events of 3rd May 1808; the narrational manner of a
shocking model plot; the appellative manner of future intervention
and prohibition. The explosion in the picture aims for the end of such
deeds and simultaneously detonates the process of merely 'aesthetic'
representation and reception. The picture cannot be considered
simply as an aesthetically contemplative structure; instead it triggers a
multitude of perceptive feats. Piercing the contemplation cocoon in
favor of a multidimensional perception, it transcends into contexts
ofcommunication and life. The picture thus becomes a warning: things
such as this shooting are no longer to occur, it declares. So in Paris
in the nineteen thirties, anti-fascist demonstrators carried with them
placards on which the picture had been copied, thus ensuring that its
transgression of the museum's threshold was not just metaphorical.
The perception of art is restricted to no single aesthetic feat,
involving rather a multitude of feats in which diverse acts from the
palette of aesthetic perceptive forms belong to the perception of a
work. The singular work is characterised by a specific selection from
and combination of this range of aesthetic feats and stipulates a
specific array of perceptive modes for which the work functions as a
point of intersection, so to speak. A traditionalist aesthetician might
object that, while several ways of perceiving are in play in Goya's
picture, only one of these is the specifically aesthetic one, and it is this
which is to be dealt with exclusively in aesthetics. lhis argument,
however, comes close to an oath of disclosure when it suggests in this
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'aesthetic' constriction that no art, only at best one element of art, can
be understood. An aesthetics which limits itself to an 'aesthetic' of this
sort would render itself recognisable as a narrow gauge aesthetics.
A further percepti ve dimension which is often important for aesthetic
judgement becomes clear when one moves on to Manet's picture The
Shooting ofMaximilian of 1868, which obviously has Goya's work as
a foil. Hi Perception of the picture by Manet includes that of Goya's
precedent. The perception here has to be intericonic, otherwise it
would simply fail to recognise the complexity of Manet's picture. In
addition to the palette ofpercept ive modes previously named, perceptive
feats involving the history of painting-intericonic awareness. that
is-are necessary here. Marcel Duchamp's Mafia Lisa parody
LH.O.O.Q. of 1919 may be taken as a further example. I? In addition
to its evident intericonic structure. a semantic dimension is also to be
included: the sequence of letters in the title is to be read as 'e11e a
chaud au cuI' ('her ass is hot'). How ridiculous the retreat to mere
aesthetic contemplation would be in this case! In order to understand a
picture such as this you must not only see, but also know, suspect.
make inferences. Things here are not settled by orientation towards
the execution or self-referentiality alone. Reflection is more important
than contemplation-though. equally, there arc dangers inherent in
using contemplation as the sole legitimate aesthetic outlook.
Dimensions of historical perspective belong to works of art in the
same way as semantic and allegorical: social, political, and everyday
dimensions-and. ofcourse, emotional and imaginative processes too.
Not all of these and other perceptive modes are at play in every picture.
but several always take part. Something similar can be seen with
music. You can practically hear the salvation in some of Bach's
fugues. The inner musical prerequisite for this can easily be stated:
every resolution of dissonant tension offers the chance of being
developed through to salvation. Do we want to object reprovingly,
wherever music not only thematises salvation but allows it to become
real, that music has drifted into the transaesthetic and must be pruned
back to the phantom of a pure aesthetic as a countermove? Peny
mindedness of this type would go too far for everyone. Bach wanted to
create music. and not just comply with a reductionist aesthetic theory.
In Mozart's Marriage of Figaro there is a scene in which the Count
Almaviva. filled with jealous distrust, knocks on the door of the
countess. But in no way does the music indulge itself in this human
lowliness. In this way it makes clear the contradistinction between
society as an ensemble of swindlers and swindled on the one hand, and
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music on the other, in which alone inhere truth and dignity and
humanity. But this radiant sovereignty can only be heard completely
when perceived against the scenic events. The music intangibly criticises
that which it cannot touch. It is this douhlc perception. not just a merely
'musically' contemplative listening, which is needed to he able to
perceive this superiority and purity of the music.
Adorno once highlighted art's inalienahle douhle structure with
reference to Beethoven: 'That someone is so little conversant with a
Beethoven symphony unless they understand the so-called purely
musical events in it-in just the same way as someone who doesn't
perceive in it the echo of the French Revolution; and how both
elements mediate themselves in the phenomenon counts among the ...
inalienable themes of philosophical aesthetics'. This led Adorno to the
observation that 'aesthetic experience ... [must] transcend itself. t8
This characterises in nuce what I want to point out here on the whole:
the aesthetic has need. too. of the transaesthetic. and what is decisi ve
for the single work is how the two are brought together in it.
What holds for all traditional art. moreover. holds even more for
modern art. which distinguishes itself by testing. questioning and
altering its boundary conditions in a particular way. It does not simply
rinse off an apparently well defined programme named 'art', but raises
anew in each of its works the question of what art is, and provides
novel answers accordingly. Artworks are able to alter their short and
long range conditions, can make unaccustomed criteria requisite, or do
away with the boundaries of art. In this way Duchamp questioned the
dictate of visibility, Joyce the form of the book. Pollock the limit of
painting. Cage the status of music. It was precisely the project of the
avant-garde to transcend the confined status of an artistics and to open
itsclfto an aesthetics beyond aesthetics. It would be an anachronism to
want to ignore or annul this through an aesthetic-theoretical restriction.
Highly varying perceptive modes become more or less relevant
according to artistic type. One artwork can require perceptive modes
which for another are completely irrelevant. For some of Malewitsch's
works it is not enough to observe what is factually given. rather the
perception must extend into the cosmic (and Malewitsch helps you in
this. for instance through the way he uses hlack). You have not seen
Munch's painting The Scream until you have actually heard a scream;
the visual perception must proceed through to an acoustic one. With
Duchamp. however. the activity of the senses is insufficient altogether;
without bringing in reOection you would recognise only banal
nonsense. Pollock can only be apprehended kinaesthetically. But woe
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betide whoever wants to insist on this with Mondrian. Sol LeWitt
demands an analytic construction of vision. And On Kawara can only
be really perceived along with the horrific vision of Hiroshima. The
disagreements of even aesthetically highly experienced observers are
not just reducible to subjective taste, they result far more from the
availability or unavailability of the specific perceptive modes required
for the specific work of art.
Each time, a specific reconfiguration of the perceptive field takes
place. The palette of conventional perceptive modes is overturned or
constellated anew, traditional hierarchies are deposed and new ones
established. Precisely the perception of something unapparent or
unheard, even of something imperceptible in the traditional sense, can
slip into first place. Art intransigently determines lor itsclfthe field of
perceptive types relevant to it, the perception of art being on principle
polyaesthetic, not monoaesthetic. Without the introduction ofeveryday
perceptual competence you would not even he ahle to recognise the
objects in pictures. Beyond this, it is advantageous to have aperception
honed by experience of the art at your disposal. It cannot hurt if you
know what a complementary contrast is, for example, or wherein the
artificiality of the seemingly natural central perspective lies-its only
this which lets you see the measures which Masaccio had to adopt so as
to produce suspenseful pictures in spite of isocephaly. Put another
way, you must know the established codes in order to recognise
deviations and new emphases; the pictar dactus also calls for a receptor
dactus.
The recipient's perceptive faculty must therefore probe varying
forms of perception and discover the specific constellation stimulated
by the work. Aesthetic experience as a whole distinguishes itself
through a combination of contemplation, imagination, and rellection.
Even contemplation is not simply observational. but evolving and
reflexive. Fundamentally so, moreover: even the apprehension of
linear convergence and di vergence or of colour contrasts alone implies
feats of sensible reflection. What is respectively seen is not !llclllm
brutum, but is preceded by the interpretative process and dependent on
subsequent viewing. And in these acts of interpretation pictorial
experience as well as life experience come in. The perception that a
gesture is reaching out and yet at the same time shies from taking its
grasp would not be possible without a certain maturity and sensitivity
on the perceiver's behalf. And Caravaggio's attack on the sovereignty
of pictures can tirst be seen correctly against the background of his
predecessors and contemporaries. References to the Iifeworld thus
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belong to the picture process in the same way as intericonic allusions.
Experiencing art requires a particular openness to the alteration of
familiar categories and divisions and distinctions. moreover, for art
assumes the freedom to divide the world up in unaccustomed ways or
to show up correspondences, analogies. transitions between sectors
considered separate. Morandi's still Iifes, for instance, are not
straightforward stilllifes of objects, but are sociogrammes at the same
time. The arrangement of objects is to be read just as that of families.
You recognise hierarchies. contacts, fears. self-assertions, evasi ve
manreuvres, dismissals, linkages. As an artist, Morandi practises
microsociology. just as Mondrian practised macrosociology. His
pondering art concerned not only pictorial clements, but represented
a model for the balancing of life's burdens at the same time-just
as must be achieved in every individual life and. analogously. in the
life of every cultivated society. These silent. seemingly unpretentious
works are first fully perceived when their grasping of practical
dimensions is recognised. Mondrian himself also understood them as
paradigms for the equation of social forces which characterises
democratic societies.
Again, the experiencing of art is compelled to include seemingly
alien horizons. Only when complex does it succeed, because art brings
several types ofperception into play. suggesting a specific constellation
of these perceptions as well as an often unaccustomed organisation of
the perceptive field as a whole. It is the very fact that neither the range
nor the relationship of perceptive dimensions is fixed once and for all
which distinguishes aesthetic perception. A disposition to general
'aesthetic' contemplation or a restriction to formal analysis would on
the other hand systematically diminish and misrecognise the potential
that works of art have to grasp outwards. If one wanted to deny the
polyvalence and lateral holds of aesthetic perception-because, say,
contemplation alone is alleged to be relevant, demanding the dismissal
of all everyday. social, semantic, as well as other perceptive
dimensions-then the danger exists that such august contemplation
tends to approach not seeing but mere gaping. (When Andrea, the
young lad in Brecht's Life of Calileo, insists 'that in the evening the
sun halts somewhere other than in the morning. So it can't, after all,
stand still!', Galileo answers, 'You see! What do you see! You see
nothing at all. You're just gaping. Gaping is not seeing'.)19
Ifart constantly brings into playa whole palette ofsorts of perception
and affords each a certain organisation. then aesthetics too. as the
reflexive authority of the aesthetic, obviously has to be in a position to
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take account ofdiverse sorts ofperception and differing constellations.
and to do justice to them. Put another way. the experiencing of art itself
demands an aesthetics which looks both at the inner polyaesthetics of
art and at art's transartistic entanglements; an aesthetics which is
capable of considering all dimensions of aistllesis. Aesthetics must
extend over the whole breadth of the aesthetic. What will the structure
of the discipline aesthetics be in the wake of such an expansion? My
answer is surely not surprising: its structure will be transdisciplinary. I
imagine aesthetics being a field of research which comprehends all
questions concerning aisillesis. with the inclusion of contributions
from philosophy. sociology. art history. psychology, anthropology,
neurosciences, and so on. Aisillesis forms the framework of the
discipline. And art is one-but. as important as it might be. only one-
of its subjects.
More surprising. perhaps. is my envisagi ng the parts of the discipline
referring to aistllesis as hecoming effective hranches of the discipline
aesthetics. They would be integrated in its institutional structure.
Aesthetics ought to be interdisciplinary or transdisciplinary in itself.
instead of displaying interdisciplinarity only when occasioned by
meetings with other disciplines. In an aesthetics department. as I
envisage it, all the branches mentioned ought to be taught; and the
individual aestheticians themselves ought to have considerable
knowledge of them. and be in a position to teach at least some of these
branches themselves-and not just. say. an ontology of art or the
history of taste.
If this suggestion seems far too radical, still I cannot help hut think
that a structure of this type is necessary in almost every discipline
today. This derives from insights which have effected a fundamental
change in our understanding of the structure of rationalities and which,
consistently. demand an altered design to research ticlds and research
objects. Once a differentiation and separation of rationality types was
advocated. and these rationality types were held to be clearly outlined
and different in their core. More recent analyses. however. have shown
that this is at best only superficially correct. indeed is basically wrong.
The diverse rationalities cannot be delimited from one another in a
watertight manner, but exhibit core entanglements and transitions
which undercut traditional departmentalisation. Such entanglements.
transitions and penetrations have become the contemporary agenda.
Of his own paradigm shift in philosophy. Wittgenstein wrote: 'I still
find my own way of philosophising new. and it keeps striking me so
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afresh; that is why I need to repeat myselfso often. It will have become
second nature to a new generation. '20 I am not claiming that the
transdisciplinary structure of an aesthetics beyond aesthetics will,
analogously, have become second nature to another generation. But
this might very well be the case. Outside the discipline it seems already
to be the case.
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